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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF UTAH
~LDON

P.

ROWLEY~

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

fHE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH; THE STATE INSURANCE FUND; and EDGEMONT
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

Case No.
10053

Defendants and Respondents.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this brief we are defending the Industrial Commission's decision and order dated September 30, 1963,
in which the Commission denied Eldon P. Rowley's
application for workmen's compensation benefits relating
to his accident of December 9, 1961.
We agree partly with the statement of facts contained
in the Brief of Plaintiff; but feel that we should state
some additional facts to make the case more clear.
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On May 18, 1962, Eldon P. Rowley filed his application with the Industrial Commission, in which he
stated on Dec. 10, 1961 he had an accidental injury
in the course of his employment with the Edgemont
Development Company, which had its Workmen's Compensation insurance in the State Insurance Fund. Dec.
10, 1961 was a Sunday. Mr. Rowley's later statements
specified the day of the accident as Saturday, which
would make it Dec. 9, 1961.
The first Industrial Commission hearing of this case
was held on November 13, 1962 by Clarence J. Frost,
who was acting as the Industrial Commission's referee
at that time. On Jan. 8, 1963, referee Frost made his
Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
to the Industrial Commission, ( R. 38) , in which he made
several errors, among them being one that "the alleged
injury occurred on a Sunday afternoon." In the latter
part of his recommendations Mr. Frost said that Mr.
Rowley's injury was on December 8, 1961. Dec. 8, 1961
was a Friday. So the referee was wrong in both findings.
The referee also recommended a finding # 2 : that "the
in jury resulted from an accident arising out of or in the
course of employment."
After the Industrial Commission adopted the recommended findings and conclusions of the referee, in its
Order dated Jan. 14, 1963, (R. 37), the State Insurance
Fund filed an Application for Rehearing, ( R. 39), which
the Industrial Commission granted on Feb. 28, 1963.
(R. 40) On May 20, 1963, the rehearing of this case
was held by the Industrial Commission, with the chairman of the Commission presiding. (R. 42) Thereafter,
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on Sept. 30, 1963 the Commission made its final decision
and order, (R. 60), the third paragraph of which said:
"The Commission does not disagree with the
referee's finding that an accident occurred***."
In the fourth paragraph of this decision, the Commission said :
"The Commission finds and concludes that the
accident did not arise out of or in the course of
applicant's employment."
In the next to last paragraph, the Commission said:
"Applicant was not discharging a duty he was
em played to perform or something in some way
connected with or incidental to the duty owing
to his master."
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER
OF FEB. 28, 1963, GRANTING THE REHEARING,
HAD THE EFFECT OF VACATING ALL OF THE
PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE.
There have been several decisions of the Supreme
Court of Utah, which have discussed the legal status of
an Industrial Commission case following the action of
the Commission granting a rehearing. In the case of
Carter vs. Ind. Comm., 76 Utah 520, 290 Pac. 776, the
Court's opinion went into this subject at considerable
length, and among other things said, (p. 537):
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"The effect of granting the rehearing, unless
otherwise restricted or limited, is to vacate and
set aside the prior order or judgment of the
Commission and try the case anew. Whatever
order is made on such rehearing, it is in effect a
new order ot judgment, analagous to a judgment
rendered on a new trial."
At the rehearing of the case on May 20, 1963,
(R. 43), we stipulated that the testimony of the witnesses
who had testified at the former hearing on November 13,
1962, would be considered as given at the rehearing; but
we also stated:
"We are not stipulating to the correctness or
the truthfulness of anything,"
also
"We are not waiving any objection that may
be had to any part of any testimony which might
be incompetent or immaterial."
After the rehearing of May 20, 1963, the Industrial
Commission's record then consisted of the testimony given
by the witnesses at the hearing of Nov. 13, 1962, and also
the testimony of Joseph Kirkham which was given at
the rehearing, ( R. 45 - 48), most of which related to
the statement which Mr. Rowley had made to Mr. Kirkham on April 9, 1962, which was four months after the
accident and eight months prior to the first hearing. In
taking Mr. Rowley's statement, Mr. Kirkham had used
a Dictaphone, (with the knowledge and consent of Mr.
Rowley). (R. 47) He quoted 1\tfr. Rowley as saying:
"We were in the neighborhood because we
stopped in to see his (my son's) friend. 11y son,
Robert, had just recently returned from his six-
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months training at Fort Ord. And we consequently,
in making the visit to his friend, who didn't happen to be home, we were in the neighborhood
where Mr. Jensen's home was located, so we went
by to check and see how the utilities in the house
were working."
From the foregoing statement, it appears that the
main purpose of the trip on that Saturday afternoon,
was the taking of his son to visit his friend. The other
matter of calling at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Jensen
and inquiring about the utilities, was merely an incidental.
POINT 2
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT
REQUIRED TO FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT
ELDON P. ROWLEY'S ACCIDENT OF DECEMBER
9, 1961 AROSE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF
HIS EMPLOYMENT.
There have not been many Workmen's Compensation
cases in the Supreme Court which involved a factual
situation similar to that ·which is contained in our present
case, where the "employee' who had the accident was
substantially his own boss because he owned or controlled
the company which was the employer, and he could
choose the times of his work duties as he might see fit.
In order for the Industrial Commission to perform its
function and duty of determining the facts, it was required to evaluate Mr. Rowley's testimony to determine
whether he started out from his home that Saturday
afternoon with the purpose in his mind of performing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
services for the employer, Edgemont Development Company, or whether the main purpose of the ride which
he and his son took that afternoon was personal in nature,
that is for the purpose of visiting together and of taking
his son to see his friend, and that any services relating
to the affairs of the Edgemont Development Company
were merely incidental.
What may have been Mr. Rowley's purpose and intention when he and his son started out from their home
that Saturday afternoon, was exclusively within his own
mind. Neither we nor the Industrial Commission can
read his mind; so they and we must attempt to determine
what was in his mind, partly by his actions, and partly
by what he said about it on the occasions when he did
make statements about it.
The testimony of Joseph Kirkham at the Commission's rehearing of this case, quoted Mr. Rowley's statement of April 9, 1962 relating to his purpose in making
the automobile trip on that Saturday afternoon, Dec. 9,
1961. The statement indicated that the main purpose of
the trip was personal or familial in nature. (R. 47)
Regardless of what Mr. Rowley's legal status may
have been during the half-hour period he was in the
Jensen home discussing how the furnace and the other
utilities were working, he had finished that mission, according to his own testimony. (R. 14 & 21). He left the
Jensen home and was walking over to where the Edgemont Development Company's tractor was located, for
the purpose of helping his son get the tractor started.
He was 200 feet away from the Jensen home when he
stepped off the curb of the public sidewalk and fell.
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( R. 15) He said that their purpose in procuring the
tractor was so that his son could help pull Jensen's trailer
out of the snow in his back yard, so that he could complete moving his furniture from his trailer into his house.
The ultimate question then comes down to this: Was

it a function and duty of Mr. Rowley to his employer, to
take part in procuring said employer's tractor, so that
his son could use it to pull out of the snow the trailer of
a former customer to whom a company built home had
been sold, so that said former customer could more easily
complete moving his furniture from his trailer into his
house?
It had not been contracted or agreed by the Edgemont
Development Company that the company would move
the furniture of their customers into the houses which
customers might buy from said company. The matter
of getting their furniture moved into their new home
was the Jensen family's own business. It was not the
business of the Edgemont Development Company. That
corporation was in the construction business, not the
moving business.
There is strong reasonable basis supporting the Industrial Commission's finding and conclusion that Mr.
Rowley's accident of Dec. 9, 1961 did not arise out of
or in the course of his "employment" when he slipped
in the snow at the side of the curb of the public sidewalk.
Either his whole detour over to the Jensen home that
afternoon was nothing but incidental; or if he was in
the course of his employment when he was in the Jensen
home discussing their utilities, after he walked away from
the Jensen home he was "on his own" again. In other
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words, he had reverted to the same status after leaving the
Jensen home as he was in before going there. Some examples of other possible factual situations may be helpful
in analyzing this case.
If, on a Saturday afternoon Mr. Rowley and his son
were going to a grocery store to do the week -end shopping
for their family, and they happened to see Mrs. Jensen
(or any other former customer of the Edgemont Development Company) coming out of the store with several
bulky packages, and Mr. Rowley and his son volunteered
to carry some of the packages to her car, and in doing
so Mr. Rowley slipped in the snow at the curb of the
sidewalk and injured his ankle and back; would that
accident be in the course of his employment as manager
and salesman of the Edgemont Development Company?
Obviously the answer is "No."
Another example of a similar factual situation is as
follows: If, on a Saturday or Sunday afternoon Mr.
Rowley and his family are riding in his automobile, and
he sees at the side of the road Mr. and Mrs. Jensen with
a' flat tire or some other mechanical difficulty with their
automobile, (and because of knowing them as former
customers of his company to whom he had sold a house),
Mr. Rowley stops and tries to assist them with their
problem; in doing so he slips in the snow and injures
himself; would he be conisdered as being in the course
of his employment with the Edgemont Development
Company? Again the answer is "No," even though the
basic factual situation is quite similar to that which is
involved in our present case.
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It should be kept in mind that the burden of proof
is upon the applicant to establish his claim. Grasteit vs
Ind. Comm., 76 Utah 487, 290 Pac. 764, Wherritt vs Ind.
Comm., 100 Utah 68, 110 P.2d 374, General Mills, Inc.
vs Ind. Comm., 101 Utah 214, 120 P.2d 379. This is the
rule whether the applicant is represented by an attorney
or whether he acts as his own attorney as Mr. Rowley
did at both of the hearings. Spencer vs Ind. Comm., 81
Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618.
In the case of Kent vs Ind. Comm., 89 Utah 381, 57
P.2d 724, pages 384 -385 of the Supreme Court's opinion
contains the following language:
"\Vhen the Industrial Commission denies compensation and the case is brought to this court
for review, a different type of search of the record
is demanded than when the Industrial Commission
makes an award of compensation and the record
is likewise brought here for review.
In the denial of compensation, the record must
disclose that there is material, substantial, competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make
a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a matter
of law, that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily
and capriciously disregarded the evidence or unreasonably refused to believe such evidence."
Smith vs Ind. Comm., 104 Utah 318, 140 P.2d 314,
is a case which deals particularly with the weight of an
interested witness' testimony. At page 323 of the Supreme
Court's opinion is found the following language:
"The weakness of the plaintiff's case is that
there is no evidence other than his own testimony
that he had an accident, or the details or effects
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thereof, and he is an interested witness. By the
nature of the accident it is impossible to contradict
his testimony. Such a situation presents an opportunity for imposition. * * * Everyone recognizes
that an interested witness is not entitled to as much
credibility as one who is not interested."
At page 327 of the Smith case, the opinion quotes
from the case of ~'Vorris vs Ind. Comm., 90 Utah 256,
61 P.2d 413:
"But in order to reverse the commission*** it
must appear at least that (a) the evidence is uncontradicted and (b) there is nothing in the record
which is intrinsically discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony and (c) that the uncontradicted
evidence is not wholly that of interested witnesses
* * * and (d) the uncontradicted evidence is such
as to carry a measure of conviction to the reasonable mind and sustain the burden of proof, and
(e) precludes any other explanation or hypothesis
as being more or equally as reasonable, and (f)
there is nothing in the record which would indicate
that the presence of the witnesses gave the commission such an advantage over the court in aid
to its conclusions that the conclusions should for
that reason not be disturbed."
The case of Greer vs Ind. Comm., 74 Utah 379, 279
Pac. 900, while it does have several points in which its
factual situation differs from the factual situation of our
present case, does contain a general statement of law
which is applicable here:
"But the mission (for the employer) must be
the major factor in the journey or movement, and
not merely incidental thereto; that is to say if
incidental to the main purpose of going to or from
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the place of employment, it would not bring such
person under the protection of the Act. * * *
There was nothing he was doing for his master
at the time which exposed him to the perils of
the street. * * * The accident did not occur while
he was actually engaged in the performance of a
duty for the employer."
POINT 3
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT
REQUIRED TO AWARD COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO THE APPLICANT.
In addition to the statement of Mr. Rowley which
the witness, Joseph Kirkham quoted in his testimony at
the rehearing, as we have herein previously referred to,
Mr. Kirkham also testified relating to Mr. Rowley's
previous back trouble, ( R. 48) :
"Mr. Rowley had been telling me the story
with reference to Mr. Jensen's car, or trailer, being
stuck in the snow, and that they had gone over to
get a tractor to pull it out, and he had been telling
me about being embarrased in not being able to
help very much because he had been wearing a
belt, or a brace, and I asked him this question:
"This brace that you were wearing at the time,
will you explain what it was, the reason you were
wearing a brace at the time, and what were you
wearing this brace for?" Mr. Rowley's answer:
"I had had back trouble for a period of approximately two years. In August of 1960 I went to
Dr. Charles M. Smith, Jr. with my back. I was
in pain constantly because I was unable to do my
work. Hardly any movement at all would cause
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pain in my back, and I "''ent to him and he
diagnosed it as I recall disc fracture, and he prescribed this brace for me, which I had worn daily
from the time of the injury."
The Plaintiff's Brief, (page 8) cited the case of
Stroud vs Industrial Commission, 2 Utah 2d 270, 272
Pac. 2d 187. The basic facts of that case are dissimilar
to the basic facts in our present case. Sergeant Stroud
had arrived at the police station to check out a special
car to two policemen, and it was while he was waiting
there for them to arrive that he received his fatal injury
by 4is gun accidentally dropping from its holster and
discharging. In our present case, Mr. Rowley had completed whatever work might possibly have been within
his duties as an employee, (manager and salesman) of
the Edgemont Development Co., namely his checking
of the utilities, etc. ; and he had left the Jensen home
and was walking on the public sidewalk 200 feet away,
when he had his accident by stepping off the curb into
the snow. (R. 14- 15)
The cases cited at page 9 of the Plaintiff's Brief are
not particularly helpful in our present discussion, as an
examination of each of those cases shows very little
similarity in the controlling facts to those of Mr. Rowley's
case.
In the case of Holland vs Ind. Comm., 5 Utah 2d 105,
297 P. 2d 230, the Supreme Court's opinion said:
"***this court cannot say as a matter of law
that it was unreasonable for the Commission to
have found as a fact from all the evidence before
it, that plaintiff's ailment was not caused by an
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accident and since the Commission's findings are
binding on this Court unless it can be shown as a
matter of law that they are so unreasonable as to
be arbitrary or capricious, this court cannot do
otherwise than affirm its decision."
In the case of Lorange us Ind. Comm., 107 Utah 261,
153 P.2d 272, it said:
"Unless therefore it can be said, upon the
whole record, that the commission clearly acted
arbitrarily or capriciously in making its findings
and decision, this court is powerless to interfere.
* * * It was not intended, * -t.· * that this court,
in matters of evidence, should to any extent substitute its judgment for the judgment of the commission."
In its Order and decision of Sept. 30, 1963, ( R. 60),
the Industrial Commission cited the Supreme Court's
decision in the case of Sullivan us Ind. Comm., 79 Utah
317, 10 P.2d 924. Plaintiff's Brief (p. 8) argues that the
Sullivan case is not in point. Admittedly there are some
factual differences between the Sullivan case and our
present case; but the Supreme Court has not changed the
rule quoted in the latter part of the Commission's Order:
"To be compensable, it must appear that at
the time of the in jury he was discharging some of
the duties he was employed to perform, or that
he was doing something in some way connected
with or incidental to the duty owing to the master."
The argumentation of Mr. Rowley at the first hearing,
which is quoted in Plaintiff's Brief at pages 6 & 7, is not
part of the Industrial Commission's record now. After
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the Commission had granted the rehearing, at the commencement of the rehearing on May 20, 1963, we stipualted that the testimony given by the witnesses at the
first hearing would be considered as given at the rehearing, ( R. 43 & 44) ; but that stipulation did not include
the argumentation which Mr. Rowley had made at the
first hearing.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision and order of
the Industrial Commission should be affirmed by this
Court.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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